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Insurance Mergers and the Clayton Act
Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is generally thought to
limit the reach of Section 7 of the Clayton Act over mergers between
insurance companies.' According to Section 2(b):
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regu-
lating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that after June 30,
1948, . . . the Sherman Act . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the
Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be applicable to the busi-
ness of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State law.
2
The meager case law holds that the proviso to Section 2(b) restricts
enforcement of Section 73 to insurance mergers unregulated by com-
parable state antitrust laws.4 While the proviso explicitly mentions the
Clayton Act, the body of Section 2(b) could also be read to hamper
I. "Section 2(b) of tie McCarran Act, however, restricts the application of Section 7
where the merger involves two insurance companies. To the extent that state laws reg-
ulate such mergers, the McCarran Act exempts them from the effects of the Clayton Act."
Note, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. RPv.
1088, 1101 (1962). This is one of the leading commentaries. See also SuncoN,,lr. or, Tilt
PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE CoMM., ABA SEC. INSURANCE, NEGLI-
GENCE AND COMPENSATION LAw, MERGER OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 71 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as ABA INSURANCE MERGERS]; Brainard and Dirlam, Antitrust Regulation and the
Insurance Industry: A Study in Polarity, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 235 (1966); Stern, Tite
McCarran Act Twenty Years After, 1966 INS. L.J. 605; see p. 1409 infra.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). While § 7 is the chief federal weapon against anticompetitive
mergers, § I of the Sherman Act may also be used. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (civil suit against merger of two banks). The Sherman
Act, along with the Federal Trade Commission Act, should apply to insurance mergers
for the same reasons that § 7 should. Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 346-48 (1963).
4. Only two cases have considered this question. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. American
Gen. Ins. Co., 1964 CCH Trade Cas. 71,188 (D.D.C. 1964), a private § 7 stilt brought
against merging insurers from two states, the court based its jurisdiction on the following
grounds:
No regulation of the proposed acquisition of control of Maryland or its agencies
can be adequate or effective because of territorial limitations of Texas anti Maryland
regulation. Texas and Maryland statutes do not provide for adequate or effective
regulation of the proposed acquisition of control of Maryland or its agencies and
there is no such regulation thereunder as precludes this suit under the antitrust
laws.
Id. at 79,721.
In United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
legislative and territorial constraints provided the grounds for federal antitrust jurisdic.
tion over a merger between Illinois and Missouri insurers. While Missouri had an anti-
merger law, Illinois insurance laws regulated only the rate-making and solvency aspects
of mergers. In addition to the Illinois insurer's immunity from the Missouri law, the
merger's effects in ten other states underscored the territorial problem.
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Section 7 enforcement. Section 7 would thus be unable to "invalidate,
impair, or supersede" any state statute regulating the "business of
insurance." The Supreme Court's latest reading of Section 2(b),
5 how-
ever, should result in a salutary broadening of the scope of the
Clayton Act to include all insurance mergers.0
I. Congressional Policy Toward Insurance Mergers
The only interpretation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act which har-
monizes its historical background, underlying objectives and various
sections shows that Congress intended no antitrust exemption for in-
surance mergers.7 The insurance industry, which requested the legis-
lation, expressly refused to ask for such an antitrust exemption.,
Indeed, many proponents of the bill emphasized that it was intended
to promote competition. 9 But rate-making in concert, a peculiarity of
insurance deemed essential to proper risk distribution,
0 constituted
5. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
6. Future federal challenges to anticompetitive insurance mergers seem likely.
[Tjhe Federal Trade Commission has taken active steps to stem the rising tide of
insurance company mergers. . . . The Commission is conducting an in-depth study
to determine the market structure and how merger activity affects the competitive
climate of the automobile insurance industry.... Recently, this Division [of Mergers
of the Federal Trade Commission] has instituted several investigations of mergers
involving insurance companies. Justification for inquiry into any substantial merger
affecting the insurance industry does exist, and it is safe to conclude that during the
remainder of the year 1969, Division activity will be greatly increased.
Reffkin, "1fergers"--Conglomerates Purchasing Insurance Companies-Insurance Com-
pardes Purchasing Other Insurance Companies, May 26, 1969 (address before Annual
Convention of New Jersey Association of Independent Insurance Agents) 15-17.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of justice is "tking a hard look at some
of these insurance company mergers." McLaren, Address before Fifth Annual Meting
of the American Insurance Assoc. May 21, 1969, 8-9. The justice Department recently
warned that it would probably try to block any merger between two insurance companies
if they are similar in size to the 200 largest manufacturing corporations. N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
7. "Congress never intended to grant federal immunity to mergers invol'ing insurance
companies based on the action or inaction of the states." Reffkin, supra note 6, at 13.
8. When the insurance industry proposed the legislation, it said that "No attempt has
been made to deal with the subjects of joint stock ownership and interlocking directorates
which will have further study." 90 CONG. REc. A4406 (1944) (Joint Statement of Chair-
man of Exec. Comm. and Chairman of Subcomm. on Fed. Legislation of Nat'l. Ass'n.
Ins. Commrs.). "It will be noted that in the draft of the proposed text of legislation no
provision has been made with reference to stock acquisitions and interlocking direc-
torates. This is not because these matters have been overlooked." Id. at A4408 (con-
dusion to memorandum explaining proposed legislation).
9. See 90 CONG. Rae. A3975-77 (Report of the Subcomm. on Federal Legislation, Nat'l.
Ass'n. Ins. Commrs.); S. REP. No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960); Hansen, Insurance
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 1957 INs. L.J. 669, 671. This type of exemption had
also previously been said to encourage competition. H.R. Rrn. No. 873, 78th Cong. 1st
Sess. 9 (1943).
Moreover, Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act expressly makes the antitrust
laws applicable to acts of boycott, coercion and intimidation. 15 US.C. § 1013(b) (1864).
10. Free competition in rate-setting had been found to tempt insurers to charge less
than what was needed to cover future losses, leading to insolvencies. To provide a
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price-fixing" and therefore required an antitrust exemption. The
original draft of Section 2(b), prepared by insurance companies and
state insurance officials, enumerated only cooperative rating and
closely related matters as warranting an antitrust exemption. 12 As a
result, the debates on the exemption concerned rate-making, not
mergers.' 3
When compared to previous bills and other sections of the Act itself,
the antitrust exemption in Section 2(b) does not seem to deal with
mergers. An earlier bill,1* passed by the House of Representatives, 15
declared that "nothing contained in the [antitrust laws] shall be con-
strued to apply to the business of insurance or acts in the conduct of
such business."' 6 This wording apparently put almost all insurance
company activities-including mergers-beyond the antitrust laws.' 7
Several legislators complained about the breadth of this bill's lan-
guage, 8 and their complaints may have led to the Senate's killing the
bill.'9 Similarly, the McCarran-Ferguson Act at some points refers
broadly to "the business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein" 20 and to "the business of insurance or acts in the conduct
broader, more exact base for predicting losses and charging rates, insurers pooled statis-tics. Rating bureaus, membership in which was often mandatory, collected this infor-mation and promulgated supposedly reasonable rates. See H.R. RaP. No. 873, supra
note 9, at 7-9.
11. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
12. 90 CONG. REc. A3977, A4405-A4406 (1944) (Report of the Subcomm. on FederalLegislation, National Ass'n. of Ins. Commrs., Recommendation Four) (§4[b] of the pro-
posed legislation).
13. See 91 CONG. REc. 478-88, 1441-44, 1447-88 (1945). Cf. SEC v. National Se-curities, Inc., 393 US. at 458. Remarks in the debates about the Clayton Act therefore
are not applicable to the purported exemption for mergers.
While the final wording of the exemption did not enumerate every activity exempted,
it was understood to apply only to those anticompetitive insurance practices inherentlynecessary to the insurance function. 91 CONG. RFc. A1625 (reprint of article by Senator
O'Mahoney, The New Federal Insurance Law). See id. at 489, 1443 (remarks of Senator
O'Mahoney). There was no itemization in order to allow new developments in insuranceunderwriting to fall within the exemption. See 91 CONG. REc. 485 (remarks of Senator
Radcliff).
Thus, the exemption is quite narrow. Wiley, Pups, Plants and Package Policies-Or
the Insurance Antitrust Exemption Reexamined, 6 VILL. L. Rxv. 281, 349-50 (1961); Note,
Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A Jurisdictional Inquiry, 67 YALE L.J. 452,453 n.4 (1958). It has even been suggested that cost factors in insurance reflecting non-risk
elements and not contributing to the "goal of actuarial creditability, should not enjoy
exemption from the antitrust laws." Note, State Supervision over Insurance Rate-Making
Cominations Under the McCarran Act, 60 YALE L.J. 160, 167 (1951).
14. S. 3270, H.R. 1369, H.R. 1370, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
15. 90 CONG. Rac. 6565 (1944).
16. (Emphasis added).
17. Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S1362, 78thCong., 1st Sess. 25 (1943) (testimony of Attorney General Biddle).
18. See, e.g., 90 CONG. REc. 6417 (1944) (remarks of Congressman Voorhis).
19. 90 CONG. Rac. 8054 (1944).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1964).
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thereof."21 In contrast, the proviso restricts its antitrust exemption to
only the "business of insurance."22 The body of Section 2(b) likewise
speaks of laws designed to regulate only the "business of insurance."
Section 8(a) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act immunized for three
years "the business of insurance or acts in the conduct thereof" from
several federal laws.23 During that time, Congress gave the states the
chance to pass regulatory legislation concerning rate-making and other
insurance activities. 24 For mergers, though, this moratorium was de-
signed to allow further study of the need for an antitrust exemption.2
The exemption expired after three years, and Congress enacted no
new merger legislation. While every state accepted the moratorium's
invitation to pass laws regulating insurance rate-making, only a few
enacted legislation concerning anticompetitive insurance mergers.20
This legislative inertia has been attributed to the states' tacit recogni-
tion that Congress never intended to exempt insurance mergers from
Section 7.
2
7
Even if legislative intent were not so clear, the requirement that
an antitrust exemption must be explicit should resolve any doubt
against the existence of an exemption for mergers.28 Moreover,
21. "Until June 30, 1948... the Sherman Act, and.., the Clayton Act, and ... the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and ... the Robinson.Patman Anti-discrimination Act.
shall not apply to the business of insurance or acts in the conduct thereof." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1013(a) (1954).
22. "The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the
activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or companies
who are subject to state regulation, but to laws 'regulating tie business of insurance'."
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. at 459.
Furthermore, in contrast to the negative language of the defeated bill, the proviso is
phrased affirmatively so that the antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of
insurance. ... By using positive wording, Congress may have expreed more force-
fully the reach of the antitrust laws over insurance companies. See United States v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. at 65.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1945); 91 CoN*G. Rrc. 1089 (19.15) (renark%
of Congressman Anderson). See also Berdon, Insurance-The Regulation Phase, 22 Co%,N.
BJ. 149, 153 (1948).
25. 90 CoNG. REc. A4408 (1944) (conclusion to memorandum of Insurance Commis-
sioners explaining proposed legislation).
26. See ABA INsuRANcE MERGERs at 80; Berdon, supra note 24, at 158.59; Note, Ap-
plication of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, supra note 1, at 1101. As
of 1966, only nineteen states had such laws purporting to regulate anticompetite in.
surance mergers.
27. Berdon, supra note 24, at 158-59. But soon after Congress passed the McCarran.
Ferguson Act, certain commentators assumed that it also covered the antitrust aspects
of insurance mergers. See, e.g., Naujoks, Regulation of the Insurance Business and Public
Law No. 15, 79th Congress, First Session, 30 MfRn. L. REv. 77, 96 (1946); Orfield. Im-
proving State Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. RIv. 219, 229.30 (1948); Sawyer,
A Program Under Public Law 15, 1946 Ixs. L.J. 72, 75.
28. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 348; California v. Fed-
eral Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1961). Since, as a result of the South-Eastern
Underwriters decision, the federal antitrust laws apply to insurance companies, the pro-
viso to Section 2(b) cannot be read to yield a negative inference that they apply to only
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even explicit exemptions are strictly construed.2 9 The importance of
maintaining a competitive economy militates against an implied anti-
trust exemption based on ambiguous legislative intent.8 0 Consequently,
any antitrust exemption contained in Section 2(b) should be inter-
preted narrowly.3'
II. The Need for Expanding the Scope of Section 7
Despite Congressional intent and the principle of narrow construc-
tion, courts and federal officials alike have read Section 2(b) to inhibit
Section 7's effectiveness against anticompetitive insurance mergers.
32
"the business of insurance," narrowly defined. The better reading is that federal antitrust
laws reach all activities of insurance companies, but those activities in "tile business of
insurance" are exempt insofar as the states regulate them.
29. See ABA INSURANCE MERGERs at 70; Michels, Insurance-The Case Against Broad
Exemptions From the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 66, 73 (1960).
30. The Supreme Court applied Section 7 to bank mergers despite a widely assumed
exemption. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). "Of course,
our construction of the amended Section 7 is not foreclosed because, after the passage
of the amendment, some members of the Congress, and for a time the Justice Depart-
ment, voiced the view that bank mergers were still beyond the reach of the Section.' Id.
at 348. The bank merger case thus closely resembles the insurance merger situation.
31. The courts, though, have sometimes strayed from a narrow construction of the
insurance antitrust exemption. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)
(state power to tax out-of-state insurer), the Supreme Court said that the purpose of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was "broadly to give support to existing and future state systems
for regulating and taxing the business of insurance." Later courts accented the adverb
"broadly" and sometimes overlooked the phrase "business of insurance." Thus the anti-
trust exemption became more extensive. See Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261
F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966); California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna
Cas. and Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959); Professional and Businessman's
Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958).
32. See note 4 supra. After FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1953), the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission applied the standard contained In
that opinion to insurance mergers, with poor results. "[WV]e recently considered a pro-
posed merger (which had been reported in the press) between a large property Insurance
company and a life insurance company. Since the pertinent State insurance statutes con-
tain so-called Little Clayton Acts, we concluded that the Clayton Act was not applicable
to the merger." Letter from Victor R. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General In charge of
the Antitrust Division, to Senator Joseph O'Mahoney, Dec. 12, 1958, quoted In Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Pursu.
ant to S. Res. 57, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 930-31 (1960).
Though various shortcomings in state regulation of insurance mergers have been inter-
preted as allowing federal antitrust regulation, such an interpretation still presupposes
that Section 2(b) theoretically restricts the scope of Section 7. See S. REi. No. 1834,
supra note 9; Hansen, Merger of Insurance Companies and Antitrust Law, 1958
INS. L.J. 782. In 1967, for example, the present Chairman of the FTC wrote that federal
antitrust "jurisdiction over [insurance acquisitions] results from the absence, Inadequacy
or impossibility of state regulation." Dixon, Federal Antitrust Laws and the Insurance
Industry, PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGAL SECTION OF THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 2,16
(1967).
Earlier this year, an FTC attorney said insurance mergers are subject to § 7 because
of the inability of the states to regulate them properly. Reffkin, supra note 6. The cur-
rent Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division thinks only a "ma-
jority of insurance company mergers are subject to the federal antitrust laws." McLaren,
supra note 6, at 8.
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According to their interpretation of the proviso, mergers between
insurance and non-insurance firms fall within Section 7 because
one of the merging firms is outside the "business of insurance."-' On
the other hand, a merger between two insurance companies sup-
posedly triggers the exemption. As soon as the proviso comes into
play, only mergers involving insurers from different states are con-
sidered fair game for Section 7.34 Following this view, the federal gov-
ernment has gone to court only once to stop an anticompetitive insur-
ance merger.35 Effective state antitrust regulation of intrastate mergers
allegedly would preclude federal antitrust regulation altogether. But
no state has ever brought an antitrust suit against an insurance
merger.A6
In this permissive climate, some segments of the insurance industry
recently have shown a clear trend toward concentration.z Along with
growing concentration, tight insurance markets have developed.39
These telltale anticompetitive signs coincide with an unprecedented
and increasing number of insurance mergers. o Although the insurance
33. Hansen, supra note 32, at 785. The Justice Department had no hesitation in chal-
lenging the merger of Hartford Fire Insurance Company and International Telephone
and Telegraph. See Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
Similarly, non-insurance companies, induding holding companies, which acquire in-
surance subsidiaries probably are also exposed to Section 7. But such exposure has been
questioned. Stern, The Future of State Regulation, ABA SEC. INSUzIUNCa. NEGLILECE
AND COMPENSATION LAW, PROCEEDINGS, 221, 223-24 (1968).
34. Under existing theory, federal antitrust jurisdiction results primarily from the
territorial limitation of state enforcement. Consequently, there have been suggestions
that the federal law would apply if the anticompetitive impact of tie merger were felt
in other states. But the only twvo cases involved merging insurers from different states.
35. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. 111. 1965).
36. See Reffkin, supra note 6, at 5; S. REP. No. 1834, supra note 9, at 216.
37. Dixon, supra note 32, at 249. The trend is readily seen in fire and casualty, where
"concentration is slight but on the rise. In life and health, concentration is high but
apparently on the decline." ABA INsuP.AIcE M RGEs, supra note 1, at 90.
In New York, the state with the largest amount of insurance written, the top twenty-
five fire and casualty companies "showed a small but steady trend in the direction of
concentration" from 62% to 68 % of the market during 1950-1966. The trend also ap-
peared among automobile insurers, going from 63% in 1950 to 76.5% in 1966. REP. oF
THE Suer. or INs. To N.Y. LEGISLATuRE, 17-19 (1968). Moreover the number of casualty,
surety, fire and marine companies licensed in New York decreased from 466 in 1948 to
423 in 1958. At. AGENCY BULL., July, 1963, Two Important Trends: Mergers and Pack-
aging 22, 23.
38. REP. OF N.Y. SPECIAL Comm. ON HOLDING Cos., Feb. 15, 1968, at 13.
39. No fewer than 282 acquisitions have been consummated or approved between
the years 1960 and 1968 involving insurance companies, with an indeterminate
number of companies having conducted discussions seeking sinilar reults. In 1963
alone there were over 100 announcements of pending marriages where both com-
panies involved insurers. There were approximately 27 announcements of engage.
ments between insurance companies and non-insurers.
Reffkin, supra note 6, at 4-5. See also ABA INsuRANca Mf.GERs, supra note 1, at 3-4;
Amos, The Merger Movement in the Insurance Industry, 19 FED. INs. Cou.ss. Q. 11 (1969);
Bernstein, A Regulator's View of Corporate Mergers, id. at 17, 18. One commentator
noted that "[O] ne . can hardly leaf through a current insurance jou ral without noting
one or more stories of amalgamations being considered, launched, or completed." He
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industry is still characterized by a large number of competitors with
small market shares, national market share and concentration statistics
may be deceptively low. Frequently, one fleet organization runs several
insurance companies, thus reducing the total number of truly inde-
pendent firms.40 In addition, many insurers are only regional, so that
national statistics may mask the true degree of concentration in rele-
vant geographic markets.4 ' In such an economic setting, therefore,
vigorous enforcement of Section 7 might accomplish one of its major
purposes: to stop incipient monopoly.
42
In fact, the peculiarities of the insurance industry call for strict
surveillance of potentially anticompetitive mergers.43 From the outset,
the inherent need for rate-making in concert limits insurance com-
petition. Thus, if an insurer subscribing to a rating bureau merges
with a non-bureau company, a rare source of price competition dis-
appears.44 Mergers also may eliminate some of the small independent
insurers which are often the first to experiment with new types of
expects "[elven greater amalgamation activity in tile future." Williams, Report on "The
Insurance Merger Handbook", ABA SEC. INSURANCE NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW,
PROcGEEINGs, 405 (1965). A Senate study some years ago had anticipated "this accelerated
merger tempo." S. REP. No. 1834, supra note 9, at 225-26.
Many insurers are also forming holding companies and acquiring insurance sub-
sidiaries. STANDARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRIAL SURVEYS--INSURANCE, Vol. 137, No. 6, § 1, Feb.
6, 1969, at 12; id. BASIC ANALYSIS, Nov. 7, 1968, at 18.
40. R. HENSLEY, COMPETITION, REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NONLIFE IN-
SURANCE 197 (1962); Dixon, supra note 9, at 247.
41. Each state's own requirements for a company to sell insurance tend to dis-
courage small insurance companies from branching out beyond their home states.
42. The Supreme Court has consistently underscored the necessity of arresting monop.
oly in its incipiency. In amending Section 7,
Congress sought to preserve competition among many small businesses by arresting
a trend toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the
point that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies. Thus, where con-
centration is gaining momentum in a market, we must be alert to carry out Con.
gress' intent to protect against ever increasing concentration through mergers.
* Congress feared that a market marked at the same time by both a continuous
decline in the number of small businesses and a large number of mergers would
slowly but inevitably gravitate from a market of many small competitors to one
dominated by one or a few giants, and competition would thereby be destroyed.
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966). See United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294, 317-18 (1962).
Only a few years ago, the Superintendent of Insurance of New York defended the anti.
trust exemption for insurance mergers by noting that "the [Pabst) case involved 'an In-
dustry marked by a steady trend toward economic concentration', a situation not
analogous to that in the insurance industry." [Emphasis added.] Stern, supra note 1, at
614. His statement, whether it was accurate even then, certainly is not true today. In-
deed, "[w]hen the tendency toward concentration is heightened by mergers and acquisi-
tions there is greater cause for alarm." McHugh, The Congress Loohs At Insurance,
8 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. (No. 4) 5, 15 (1958).
43. In this respect, insurance is much like banking. It is a highly regulated financial
industry essential to the national economy. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 US. 533, 539-42 (1944). As a result, competition becomes more crucial. Cf.
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
44. S. REP. No. 1834, supra note 32, at 225.
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policies.4 5 More important, insurance companies underwrite only
those risks regarded as satisfactory.46 An insurer's ability to deny
coverage reduces the number of product sources. In a tight insurance
market, coverage for undesirable risks often becomes unavailable at
any price.
III. The Antitrust Exemption after SEC v. National Securities
Although past interpretation has assumed that Section 2(b) pro-
tects mergers, the proviso insulates only the "business of insurance."
But the word "business" is susceptible of several definitions. Some-
times it means an enterprise, and when considered as a group of like
enterprises, an industry. Hence, an insurance company is an insurance
"business" and all insurance companies together form an industry
called the "business of insurance." These enterprise-industry defini-
tions comprise the semi-articulated premise of present antitrust en-
forcement.47 In other contexts, however, "business" is the particular
commercial activity conducted by an enterprise or industry. Conse-
quently, the insuring activities of an insurance company are another
possible definition of the "business of insurance."
In SEC v. National Securities, 12c.,48 the Supreme Court attempted
for the first time to define explicitly the term "business of insurance."
The SEC contended that two merging Arizona insurance companies
violated its anti-fraud rules. 49 Arizona has a statute that regulates in-
45. Hedges, Improving Property and Casualty Insurance Coverage. 15 LA', & Co.-
Ts'mP. PROB. 353, 355 (1950).
46. Some commentators have made the serious mistake of putting insurance into the
same class as utilities. See Hale and Hale, Competition or Control 1: The Chaos in the
Cases, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1958); Hale and Hale, Competition or Control IV: Ap-
plication of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962). But
utilities and common carriers must serve all comers at reasonable rates. Such regulated
industries are said to trade their market discretion for exemption from the antitrust
laws. The mistake in dassifying insurance as a utility probably stems from an attempt
to rationalize an assumed antitrust exemption. See Hale and Hale, Mergers in Regulated
Industries, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 49, 55 (1964).
47. FTC attorney Reffkin asks "why should the federal government express concern
about an industry whose 'business' Congress felt could be adequately regulated on a
local level by the states?", but then proceeds to offer the conventional reasons for Section
7 jurisdiction: defects in the quality and extent of state regulation. Refkin, supra note
6, at 4 ff. See Hansen, supra note 32 at 782; Mertz, The First Twenty Years--A Case-Law
Commentary on Insurance Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, ABA SEC. ItSUR-
ANcE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, PROCEERINGS, 153, 178, 180 (1964).
48. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
49. Defendant, which owned a controlling interest in one insurer acquired control
of the board of directors of another insurance company. After proposing the merger.
defendant sought the approval of the second company's stockholders. In soliciting these
proxies, it allegedly misrepresented the obligations of the surviving company, thereby
violating Rule 10(b)5. The Securities and Exchange Commission wanted to enjoin the
merger. Since the merger was accomplished despite its disapproval, the Commission now
claimed the right to "unwind" the merger in order to return to the status quo ante.
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surance company stock proxies," and another that permits an insur-
ance merger if security and service for existing policyholders will be
adequate. 51 The Court held that, despite state approval of the merger,
federal jurisdiction existed to unwind it. Inasmuch as no antitrust
violation was alleged, Justice Marshall's opinion focused on the body
of Section 2(b), rather than the proviso. The Court construed "busi-
ness of insurance" as a term of art denoting the "relationship between
insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued," and a
policy's "reliability, interpretation and enforcement."5 2 According to
the Court, this definition includes rate-setting, selling and advertising
of policies, and licensing of companies and their agents.68 Those
activities of insurance companies which affect their status as reliable
insurers are also part of the "business of insurance."5 All other ac-
tivities-such as soliciting stock proxies-are outside the "business of
insurance" and subject to federal regulation.s Arizona's law control-
ling insurance company stock proxies therefore does not regulate the
"business of insurance."56 Moreover, although Arizona's statute regu-
lating solvency and service requirements is a type encompassed by
Section 2(b), the federal remedy does not "invalidate, impair, or super-
sede" it. There is no impairment primarily because the federal interest
in protecting investors is distinct from any state interest in protecting
policyholders of the merging companies.5
7
The definition of "business of insurance" provided by National
50. AIZ. REv. STAT. § 20-731 (Supp. 1969).
51. Aiz. REv. STAT. § 20-731(B)(3) (Supp. 1969).
52. 393 U.S. at 460.
53. Id.
54. "Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their
status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class." Id.
55. "Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount federal
regulation; only when they are engaged in the business of insurance does the Statute
[the McCarran-Ferguson Act] apply." Id. at 459-60.
56. Arizona is concerning itself with a markedly different set of problems. It Is at-
tempting to regulate not the "insurance" relationship, but the relationship between
a stockholder and the company in which he owns stock. This is not Insurance
regulation, but securities regulation. . . . The crucial point is that here the State
has focused its attention on stockholder protection; it is not attempting to secure the
interests of those purchasing insurance policies.
Id. at 460.
57. The Federal Government is attempting to p rotect security holders from
fraudulent misrepresentations; Arizona, insofar as its activities are protected by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act from the normal operations of the Supremacy Clause,
is attempting to protect the interests of the policyholders. . . . The paramount fed.
eral interest in protecting shareholders is in this situation perfectly compatible with
the paramount state interest in protecting policyholders. And the remedy the Com-
mission seeks does not affect a matter predominantly of concern to policyholders
alone; the merger is at least as important to those owning the companies' stock as
it is those holding their policies.
Id. at 463.
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Securities belies the assumption-seemingly taken for granted-that
Section 2(b) limits the applicability of Section 7 to insurance mergers.
Although the Court construed only the body of Section 2(b), there is
no reason why its definition of "business of insurance" should not
apply to the same phrase in th proviso. According to this definition,
mergers in themselves are surely not part of the "business of insur-
ance."58  Merging-like soliciting proxies,5 9 selling securities,c0  or
settling creditor claims in bankruptcy 1 -reflects an insurer's corpo-
rate nature rather than its particular industry.02
Of course, a merger can affect an insurance company's "status as a
reliable insurer" and for that reason might be included in the "busi-
ness of insurance." The financial condition of one partner may impair
the other company's ability to pay claims and service policyholders.63
But because merger is a non-insurance activity, it should be classified
as part of the "business of insurance" only insofar as the precise effects
sought to be regulated jeopardize the reliability or enforcement of the
merging companies' insurance policies. 4 A merger can have many
58. Courts reading Section 2(b) this way scrutinize the particular activity at issue. Cf.
Hill v. National Auto Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968). where the court
remarked that "while the settlement of claims by the payment of money could certainly
be considered to reasonably fall within the general meaning of 'business of insurance,'
it does not seem to this court that the alleged activity involved here, namely, securing
for particular glass dealers the sales and installation jobs required by Allstate claimants,
is a part of the 'business of insurance' as that term is normally understood." Id. at 296.
See notes 59-61 infra.
59. In United States v. Meade, 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960), the federal securities
antifraud rules were imposed on a company organized for purposes other than selling
insurance. "[E]ngaging in the solicitation for, sale of, and transportation of the capital
stock of the Agency Corporation cannot be said to be the business of insurance within
the meaning of the TtfcCarran Act. . . ." Id. at 876.
60. The Court itself has held that an insurance company selling a variable annuity
must register it under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, despite both the insurance
aspects of the annuity and the state regulation. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387
U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
Selling a variable annuity is not the same as selling "insurance." See United States v.
Meade, 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
61. Although an amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act was at one time thought
necessary to bring insurance company liquidations under federal law, Note, Insurance
Liquidations: A Proposed Amendment to the fcCarran.Fcrguson Act, 66 Y~u. L.J. 1072
(1957), a state court has forced creditors of a bankrupt insurance company to settle
claims according to federally prescribed priorities on the theory that an insurer in
receivership no longer transacts "business." Langdeau v. United States, 363 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
62. A former New York Superintendent of Insurance differentiated between "cor-
porate activities, those which an insurance company shares with most other kinds of
corporations, and insurance activities, those as to which the business of insurance is the
central fact." Wikler, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws. A State Outlooh, 1963 LNs. L.J.
534, 536.
63. For the same reason, merger with a non-insurer, or indeed any action potentially
endangering an insurance company's accumulated funds and reserves, should be included
in the "business of insurance."
64. The distinction which National Securities draws between a primary insurance
activity, like rate-making, and a non-insurance activity, like merger, which may have
secondary effects on an insurer's reliability, is crucial. It weakens any attempt to dis.
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consequences, and only some of them endanger the standing of the
merging companies as reliable insurers. As a result, mergers take on
a chameleon-like quality: whether they should be considered part of
the "business of insurance" depends on the type of law being enforced
against them. For the purposes of a law regulating practices which affect
reliability of the merging companies, a merger is properly regarded as
part of the "business of insurance." But a merger's anticompetitive
effects pose no threat to the solvency and reliability of the merging in-
surers. Accordingly, so far as Section 7 is concerned, no reason exists for
regarding the merger as part of the "business of insurance." Since the
proviso to Section 2(b) applies only to the "business of insurance," it
grants no federal antitrust exemption whatsoever to insurance mergers.
While an anticompetitive insurance merger is outside the "business
of insurance" with respect to federal antitrust laws, state regulation 0
of it under the body of Section 2(b) might still be thought to restrict
the scope of Section 7. State laws which proscribe insurance mergers
having anticompetitive effects, 6 for instance, might be viewed as
enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance."07
Admittedly, such statutes test illegality by the merger's effects upon
product competition. Since selling policies is the "business of insur-
ance," these state laws may therefore appear to be indirectly aimed at
that "business." Like Section 7, however, such laws are actually de-
tinguish proxy solicitation from the actual merger itself in an antitrust case. To be
sure, the SEC
did not ask the trial court to pass directly upon a merger which the State Director
of Insurance had approved. No question of the legality or illegality of the merger,
standing alone, was raised. The gravamen of the complaint was the misrepresenta.
tion, not the merger. The merger became relevant only insofar as it was necessary
to attack it in order to undo the harm caused by the alleged deception.
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. at 462. But because a merger may have some
effects on the buying and selling of policies does not mean that it therefore should be
automatically thought of as part of the "business of insurance." Only for its effects on
the reliability of the merging companies should it be so classified.
Moreover, "the case for characterizing a transaction or series of transactions as iu-
surance is weakened if there is no need to impose insurance regulation." Denenberg,
The Legal Definition of Insurance, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK AND INSUIRANCr
210, 226 (J. Hammond ed. 1968). See generally Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance
Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv.
471 (1961).
65. But these state laws may not be regulation enough to satisfy the McCarran.
Ferguson Act. They are aimed at interstate effects of mergers when such regulation was
meant to be left with the federal government. See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 225, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 67 (McKinney 1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-37 (1969).
67. Simply because a law applies only to insurance companies does not make It alaw
regulating the "business of insurance." National Securities itself described an application
of a state statute only to insurance companies as a "mere matter of form" of no Impor-
tance. 393 U.S. at 460. See also Langdeau v. United States, 363 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1962).
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signed to protect market and societal values which apply to insurance
companies as well as other firms.08 The market tests formulated by
the courts in applying Section 7 are only indicia of a merger's ultimate
consequences, 69 including its social and political overtones. 0 In reality,
the states are attempting to cope not with the "insurance relation-
ship" 71 but with the problems of industrial organization.72
State laws requiring merging insurers to maintain solvency and
service adequate for their policyholders do regulate the "business of
insurance."7:3 These state statutes, however, are no more impaired by
enforcement of Section 7 than by enforcement of the SEC's antifraud
rules. Just as the federal government has an important, distinct inter-
est in protecting investors,74 it has an equally unique and essential
interest in preserving competition and inhibiting industrial concentra-
tion in the national economy. 75 Merely because a merger meets a
68. Pressing in upon the insurance enterprise from without are all the goals ofsociety at large. For the most part the insurance business would work equally
well whether these objectives were implemented or not. This is so far true that
regulatory officials do not always recognize clearly that national economic policy,
or other general economic policy, has any relationship to supervision . . . These
general societal goals are pervasive demands which have as much validity within theinsurance institution as they have anywhere else .... There is no reason to isolate
insurance from the rest of society.
Kimball, supra note 64, at 500-01,506. See also Sawyer, supra note 27, at 76.
69. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964). Cf. FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
70. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
H.v. L. REv. 226, 236, 247-49, 304-05 (1960). The weighing of conflicting economic and
social interests is unavoidable. See also Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 78 HAzv. L. RFv. 1313, 1394-95 (1965). The Court itself early recognized amerger's threat to non-economic values. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294.
315-16 (1962).
71. Regulation of the "insurance relationship" means control of an insurer's activities
so its policyholders get the benefits of their contracts. "The McCarran-Ferguson Act wasan attempt ... to assure that the activities of insurance companies in dealing with
their policyholders would remain subject to state regulation." SEC v. National Securities,Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969). But the Act gave no new or additional regulatory powers
to the states. H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945).
72. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
implicitly recognized this distinction when it called "legislation on other insurance or
antitrust matters" insufficient. Id. at 60. Cf. lVikler, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws.A State Outlook, supra note 62, at 536. But such fine analysis has been criticized. Stern.
The McCarran Act Twenty Years After, supra note 1, at 613.
Nevertheless, courts look closely at the type of law involved. In Hamilton Life Ins. Co.v. Republic Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals calledit "quite plain that arbitration statutes, including those of Texas and New York are not
statutes regulating the business of insurance, but statutes regulating the method ofhandling contract disputes generally." Id. at 611. Furthermore, the Texas arbitration
statute, according to the District Court's opinion affirmed on appeal, "is a codification
of an old common-law rule, whose purpose was not to regulate the insurance business
but rather to preserve the jurisdiction of the courts." 291 F. Supp. 225, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See Iangdeau v. United States, 363 S.W.2d 397, 331-32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
73. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 462 (1969).
74. Indeed, for some years the courts have applied the federal securities laws toinsurance companies. See, e.g., Zachman v. Ervin, 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960);
United States v. Meade, 179 F. Supp. 868, 876 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
75. See note 42 supra.
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state's solvency standards should not preclude the federal govern-
ment from safeguarding separate national interests. In applying federal
laws regulating maritime accidents,"0 trademarks,77 and mail fraud"
8
to insurance companies, courts have found no impairment of state
regulation of the "business of insurance." National Securities itself
expressly rejected the argument that Section 2(b) bars "any attempt to
interfere with a merger approved by state insurance officials," as an
"overly broad restriction on federal power."70
Moreover, state statutes regulating mergers to protect existing
policyholders merely permit certain insurers to merge.
80 No command
ordering the merger issues from the state.81 However, even if a state
would order an anticompetitive merger to avert the insolvency of one
of the merging companies,8 2 the merger should not be exempt from
Section 7. Such a merger situation would seem to produce a direct
conflict between the state interest in preventing insurance insolvencies
and the federal interest in preserving competition. But the conflict
would be minimized by recognition of an enlarged "failing company"
defense for insurance mergers. The widespread public effects of insur-
ance failures, compared to ordinary business bankruptcies, justify the
use of a relaxed "failing company" standard in judging insurance
mergers.8 3 Despite recent weakening of the vitality of this defense,
8 4
76. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 US. 409 (1954).
77. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957),
state approval of an insurer's name did not bar a federal cause of action by another
company with a similar name. "[T]here is nothing in the McCarran Act that limits the
right of the owner of a trade or service name to seek redress in the federal courts merely
because the approval of the name of the infringing insurance company is part of the
duties of the state board." Id. at 172.
78. United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1951).
79. 393 US. at 463.
80. "Arizona has not commanded something which the Federal Government seeks to
prohibit. It has permitted respondents to consummate the merger; it did not order them
to do so." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969).
81. This situation is not comparable to that in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
where state legislation set up an anticompetitive agricultural program. "[A] state does
not give immunity to those who violate [a federal antitrust law] by authorizing them
to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." Id. at 351-52. But in North
Little Rock Trans. Co. v. Gas. Recip. Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949), af'd, 181
F.2d 174 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 340 U.S. 823 (1950), a district court in holding that
fixed automobile liability insurance rates did not violate the federal antitrust laws said
that those laws are "not violated by acts authorized and regulated by state statute." 85
F. Supp. at 964 (emphasis added).
82. At present, there is no such state law and the probabilities of unwilling insurance
companies being forced to merge is unlikely.
83. See Note, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, supra
note 1, at 1103; see Dixon, supra note 32 at 249 n.20; McHugh, Insurance and Antitrust
Laws. An Industry Outlook-Casualty Insurance, 1963 INs. L.J. 547, 552.
84. See Citizen Publishing v. United States, 394 US. 131 (1969); see Bock, Failing
'Failing' Company: Justification for Mergers, N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1969, at 1, cols. 4-5.
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the Supreme Court has shown a sensitivity to it in the related field
of banking.
8 5
IV. Conclusion
Since no state has ever attacked an anticompetitive insurance
merger, federal antitrust law seems to be the only means of halting
the current trend of insurance concentration. Preserving competition
in the insurance sector of the economy would be in the long-range
interest of insurersa8 as well as the public. But the precise scope of
Section 7 over insurance mergers has never been authoritatively de-
termined. By activating the proviso without discussion, previous lower
court decisions begged the question of whether mergers are the
"business of insurance." After National Securities, however, no court
should construe any part of Section 2(b) to restrict federal antitrust
challenges to insurance mergers. Certainly state insurance laws may
coexist with Section 7, and their concurrent jurisdiction could mean
that effective enforcement of them might make the exercise of federal
power unnecessary. In no way, however, does a state's antitrust policy
condition the existence of that federal power.
85. In the Philadelphia National Bank case, the Court wrote:
Section 7 does not mandate cutthroat competition in the banking industry, and
does not exclude defenses based on dangers to liquidity or solvency, if to avert them
a merger is necessary... .Thus, arguably, the so-called failing company defense
... might have somewhat larger contours as applied to bank mergers because of the
greater public impact of a bank failure compared with ordinary business faiures.
374 US. at 371-72, 372 n.46.
Some commentators have thought that the investment company defense should also
apply to insurance mergers. Hansen, supra note 32, at 787; Note, Application of Federal
Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, supra note 1, at 1102-03. But this very
characteristic of insurance compaies-substantial investment in other companies-sup-
plies an additional reason for halting concentration in insurance. A highly concentrated
insurance industry may lead to concentration in other fields. Cf. Address by McLaren,
supra note 6, at 9.
86. Already, tight insurance markets have prompted some states to set up assigned
risk pools for automobile and fire insurance. Under such pooling arrangements, insurance
companies are forced to cover all risks.
If, in the future, the insurance business lives more by the rules of the rest of the
economy, and the public believes it is doing so, the public will tend to treat the
insurance business more like other businesses. If the insurance business does other-
wise, the public will tend to treat it more like an extension of government-de-
manding fuller public accountability for its actions and wider public representation
in its revenue raising, and resting indifferent when its functions are absorbed by
governmen.-t.
Stewart, "The End of Isolationism in Insurance Regulation," Remarks at Fifth Annual
Meeting of American Insurance Ass'n, May 21, 1969. Consequenty, for insurance com-
panies to refrain from claiming a special antitrust exemption for mergers might be in
their sell-interest. Such actionould perhaps forestall more onerous ul n tending
to convert insurance companies into quasi-utilities, or even more rasuc, n-scale
government assumption of the insuring process.
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